POLITICS
The road to 27-S
The need to keep the sovereignty process alive was the backdrop to negotiations between CiU and ERC
When more than two million voters went to the polls on November 9 to express their opinions on the future of the country, the continuance of Catalonia's sovereignty process was assured. However, what to do next immediately became the concern. Despite the general acceptance that plebiscite elections would now be needed to provide the legal legitimacy deprived from the November vote, no decision on how to proceed could take place without the two main sovereignty parties, Convergència i Unió (CiU) and Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) finding common ground. Both parties had put their differences aside to make the November vote a success, but could they do so again and make plebiscite elections a reality?
From the beginning, president and CiU leader, Artur Mas, insisted on the sovereignty parties standing in the election together on a joint unity candidacy list. However, this aspect of Mas's sovereignty road map was also the main sticking point, as ERC preferred parties standing separately. On November 13, Mas met representatives of the sovereignty parties in the search for allies and support for his government's budget proposal due before parliament early in the new year. That meeting brought little progress and just served to show how far apart the CiU and ERC were.
Yet, as alternative alliances with other parties became increasingly unlikely, Catalonia's governing party was all but forced into bringing ERC round to its way of thinking. At the end of November, Mas made the first overtures, presenting his “winning formula” for independence by late 2016 and stating he would retire from the front line once the election was won. Mas wanted plebiscite elections with candidacies free of political affiliation, with parties, civil society and specialists, followed by an interim unity government.
Mixed response
The president's proposals received a mixed response. ERC's objections to Mas's road map were based on a belief that a joint candidacy list would not gain the necessary absolute majority in parliament and just chase centre-left voters into the arms of Podemos. And, at the end of November, Junqueras presented his own sovereignty road map, calling for immediate elections and separate candidacy lists.
As the political parties faced off, all civil society could do was wait and see. The public in Catalonia had been a key driving force behind the process, but it now found itself waiting on the outcome of private discussions between political leaders. Civil organisations like the Assemblea Nacional Catalana (ANC) now found themselves somewhat sidelined. In fact, at the end of November, the ANC withdrew from the debate out of fear of derailing the political process. From here on, progress would have to come out of the cross-party negotiations. At the start of December, Oriol Junqueras made the first move, detailing his proposals in a speech before parliament. The message was the same: ERC supported immediate elections with the parties standing separately. However, the president remained unmoved.
The first round of talks took place on December 10, with Mas and Junqueras meeting for an hour. With little real progress made, the main point of contention remained: Mas's joint list against Junqueras's separate lists. And, as usual, a stated willingness on behalf of both parties to reach agreement. Hopes of finding consensus depended in large part on approval of the government's budget proposals, a precursor for any move towards independence. As a result, ERC's next move was a “gesture of generosity”, announcing it would facilitate the first passage of the budget if the government called plebiscite elections within a month. Then, on December 20, Junqueras turned up the pressure, announcing his party would offer Artur Mas the presidency in a Catalan unity government even if his party was defeated at the polls. CiU was not impressed and accused ERC of creating “distraction manoeuvres”.
Yet, such skirmishes were no substitute for a negotiated settlement. The next meeting took place as the new year approached in a summit with the leaders and representatives of civil society. Again there was little progress. With the parties sticking to their positions in public, a further meeting took place between Mas and Junqueras on January 5. What emerged from this meeting was a three list scenario with the president standing on one candidacy list alongside prestigious independence supporters, while CUP and ERC stood separately. On January 9, Mas requested another meeting from Junqueras after leaks suggested that ERC considered a deal on the three list solution all but been agreed. Mas disabused his opposite number and sent him three more proposals in an effort to “unjam” negotiations. Time was running out as the January 15 deadline approached. The only alternative to agreement was Mas seeing out his term, even without the support of ERC.
On January 1, Mas said the process has become “complicated”. At this point, ERC was letting it be known that it approved of the three-list solution, though the sticking point was the date of the elections, which the republicans wanted in March. Finally, with the words “this has been a nightmare”, Mas, after weeks of push and shove, finally announced agreement between CiU and ERC on January 14. The central point of the agreement was setting the election date for September 27. At the same time, the two parties, with the support of civil organisations, agreed to present separate candidacies and, until September 27, work at strengthening the structures of state. In short, Mas climbed down over his joint unity list, while ERC decided to let go the insistence on March elections. The key and the next challenge up would be ERC's support for the budget.
Not only did CiU's Artur Mas and ERC's Oriol Junqueras manage to renew the mutual trust they first showed back in November during the 9-N participative process, they also re-established dialogue in mid-January by finally coming to an agreement that has since made it possible for the sovereignty process to continue. The long and winding road towards Catalonia's independence, which in the weeks leading up to the agreement even the president admitted had become “bogged down”, not only remains intact but has arguably been strengthened. CiU and ERC, albeit under the pressure of deadlines, media and independence organisations representing an impatient public, have made decisions of great significance, and set a date for the elections. Elections are always important, but the plebiscite election on September 27 is vital, as it has to stand in for the binding referendum that the Spanish government has so far prevented Catalonia from holding.
The September elections, just a few days after Catalonia's national day, which this year promises to be truly spectacular, should not be allowed to turn into a political struggle between Mas and Junqueras. What it has to be instead is a battle with the state. There were no winners or losers in the January 14 agreement. Instead, opportunities were created and the tension between CiU and ERC was eased in the run-up to the local elections in May. Subsequent agreements between the two parties will be what paves the way for Catalan sovereignty, so that the success of the process is assured in September.
There is no alternative. Between now and the day of the vote, CiU and ERC must continue to work together to not only improve on the agreements reached so far, but to come to more understandings. The two parties, along with the other players in the sovereignty camp, need to create joint strategies that will lead to the setting up of the essential structures of state that an independent Catalonia will need. Above all, everything necessary must be done to ensure that the result of the September election is a clear and convincing “yes” to independence. There is no room for doubt, especially as the election result needs to go over the head of the Madrid government and convince the international community.